The brand is caught in a warp of its own making.

The seekers and the aspirers together formed the middle class and were the backbone of consumption for a variety of products and services in India. The study showed that the number of consumers in the deprived category would decline, while the aggregate income levels of the Indian middle class would increase, together leading to a four-fold hike in aggregate consumption (see Exhibit 2). COMPANY BACKGROUND In 1929, Parle had started its operations as a manufacturer of candies in suburban Mumbai in western India. A decade later, it diversified into making biscuits. The company deployed state-of-the-art machinery that provided automatic printing and packaging, and its biscuit baking oven was the largest in Asia. Parle had 10 manufacturing sites of its own, in addition to 60 contract manufacturing facilities, located across India. In terms of managerial focus, the biscuit market was gaining ground at Parle, in part because it was a larger market than confectionery.9 The company had 40 per cent share of the total biscuit market in India and 15 per cent share of the total confectionary market in India. Many of Parle’s products were perceived as offering good value for money and were market leaders in their respective categories. Parle recorded a compound annual growth rate of 15 per cent. It had a research and development (R&D) wing focused on new product development. Its role was to use the customer insights, received from the field sales force, in developing new brand extensions and also new product categories, in both candies and biscuits. Parle produced approximately 650,000 tons of biscuits per annum, of which Parle-G, the flagship brand, comprised 500,000 tons. The company recorded sales revenue of INR35 billion in 2008/09, of which Parle-G’s contribution alone was 68 per cent. Even within the Parle-G brand, the single largest contribution came from the INR4.00 SKU, which was contributing to 50 per cent of the brand’s annual sales revenue. The biscuit portfolio included not only Parle-G in the glucose category but also Marie in the tea time category and Hide n Seek, Monaco, Krack Jack, Cheeslings, Jeffs, Sixer and Fun Centre in the premium category. The margin of premium brands typically ranged between 25 and 30 per cent. Parle-G, Monaco and Krack Jack were considered to be the core brands because of their individual contribution to the top line. Although Parle clearly had a broad biscuit portfolio with product offerings in each of the major biscuit categories, there was room to grow Parle’s presence in the premium category, which registered a growth rate of approximately 20 per cent per annum. Exports formed five per cent of Parle’s revenues. The company had adopted a “follow the customer” strategy of targeting the Indian diaspora,10 whereby the potential customers were already aware of the Parle-G brand in their home country. Parle had three contract manufacturing facilities outside India — one in Bangladesh and two in South Africa. All the facilities catered to local demand; however, the bulk of exports were manufactured in India.

9 Parle, “Smart Cookie,” press release, November 2004; available at http://www.parleproducts.com/media/media_press7.asp, accessed February 22, 2010. 10 Disapora refers to persons of Indian origin working and living outside India. An estimated 20 million Indians comprised the diaspora. The single largest majority of 3.5 million diaspora lived in the countries of the Middle East.

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Said Kulkarnii:

It is the domestic demand which drives Parle-G. The opportunities for moving the tonnage are greater in the home market than in any of the overseas markets. Exports are less of a priority for us, relatively speaking, because we believe that our resources are better spent on meeting local demand. Home market is also a market we know best.11

Parle prized — and was keen on retaining — Parle G’s ranking as the largest selling biscuit brand in the world, by tonnage. Closely linked to this ranking were two other rankings that were also valuable to Parle: the company’s share of the domestic biscuits market at 40 per cent and Parle-G’s share of the domestic glucose category at 74 per cent. The latter rankings were based on sales revenue. CONSUMERS The most widely used consumer classification system in India was known as socio-economic classification (SEC), which was developed by the Market Research Society of India in the early 1980s. SEC was uniquely suited to the Indian market. The basis of classification was not the individual consumer but the consumer’s household. In 2005/06, India had 207.1 million households12 (see Exhibit 3), of which Parle-G had penetrated 96.8 million households (see Exhibit 4). Its penetration rate of the glucose category of the Indian biscuits industry was 84 per cent. The company segmented its customers for Parle-G into two types: retail consumers and institutional consumers. Children and mothers comprised the first segment. Children formed 60 per cent of the target audience for the company. The 5- to 14-year-old age group was considered to represent both users and influencers. This group, which formed approximately 20 per cent of the population (see Exhibit 5), had the potential to generate lifelong revenues for the brand. The brand association started early because biscuits were among the first ready-to-eat foods offered to children. The second segment, the institutional consumers, included hospitals, factories, railway stations, schools, government offices and corporate offices, which usually received a discount of 3 to 4 per cent on bulk purchases. The institutional segment contributed to approximately 10 per cent of Parle’s sales revenue. Several Indian companies, even in the organized sector, focused exclusively on the institutional segment. Some of these companies regularly bid for official tenders to set up kiosks at railway stations across the country to sell a range of processed agro-products, including biscuits. COMPETITORS It was not until 1996, when Britannia Industries Ltd. (BIL), a British multinational, launched its Tiger Glucose brand of biscuits, that Parle faced nationwide competition in the domestic market in the glucose category. In 2003, a new competitor, ITC Ltd. (ITC), an Indian conglomerate with interests in hotels, agri- businesses, paper products and retailing, launched Sunfeast Glucose. Both new entrants were backed by high-powered budgets. Parle-G continued, however, to rule the mass market (see Exhibit 6). Hindustan Unilever, a multinational consumer packaged goods (CPG) company, had also entered the glucose category in 2003. Its foray was an extension of its faltering breads business. The company was 11 Based on a personal interview on June 04, 2010. 12 These data are from the last decennial national census held in 2001.

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subcontracting manufacturing of its products at two locations. It exited the biscuits business two years later due, among other reasons, to a mismatch between costs and margins. Parle also faced a few regional players, whose impact was minimal at the national level. Similar to Parle-G, both Tiger Glucose and Sunfeast Glucose were being retailed at several SKUs, and both had price points that averaged US$1 per kilogram. Rising costs had affected the two new brands more sharply because they were relatively new entrants. Their experience with SEC penetration was similar to Parle-G. Both had extensive retail network, built over years of operations in Indian CPG business. Both had built up brand equity with children in a short time, led by strong advertising campaigns (see Exhibit 7). Overseas majors, such as Nabisco in the United States, United Biscuits in the United Kingdom and Campbell Arnott’s of Australia, were eyeing the Indian biscuits market, attracted by the potential of the larger Indian foods market. Their focus was likely to be on the premium category of biscuits for three reasons: it was set to grow in future years, it was amenable to brand building and it ensured higher margins. PRICING Launched in 1939, Parle-G was targeted, from the beginning, at the Indian mass market. Parle had generally refrained from increasing the price of Parle-G, even when it had no competition. In holding to the price line, Parle had brought a disciplining factor to the Indian market. The new entrants, BIL and ITC, were under compulsion to keep prices low. When Parle opted for reducing the weight of the biscuit, BIL and ITC followed the leader. Parle-G was priced at US$1.00 a kilogram. For decades, the company had used a low price to build the glucose category in India. Parle’s dominance in the category was so strong that competitors such as BIL (which entered the glucose category in 1996) and ITC (which entered in 2003) did not adopt higher pricing. They simply stayed the course of the market leader. Decisions related to the margins for trade channels were decentralized at the local level, whereas decisions related to the end prices that the consumer paid were centralized at the corporate office in Mumbai. POSITIONING Traditionally, Indian consumers had viewed all biscuits, including glucose biscuits, more as a commodity than as a brand. Prior to 1980, Parle glucose biscuits had been called Parle Gluco. The name was changed to Parle-G so that consumers could differentiate it from the prevailing competition, which at the time was restricted to the unorganized sector. A series of innovative campaigns, in print and TV, were also developed to drive home the health benefit of the brand. However, the prevailing consumer perception was that Parle-G, and the glucose biscuit category in general, offered “value for money.” This perception was reinforced by the price points of Parle-G’s SKUs. Strength was a generic attribute to the glucose category. Physical fitness carried an appeal for the young. Boys, in particular, were drawn to evidence of muscular strength. All glucose brands used the attribute of strength in some form in their communications. Parle added a new emotional layer to the core attribute to arrive at a positioning that was unoccupied, competitive, sustainable and contemporary. The new campaign incorporated values such as honesty, sharing and caring to bring home the product’s “goodness.” Riding on

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the equity of goodness, the brand was established as enabling people to be true to who they were and to be able to go on achieve their innate goals and aspirations. The company started focusing on kids during the late 1990s, with a campaign that identified the brand with the mind of a “genius.” The next campaign tapped into a key marketing insight — that mothers wanted their sons and daughters to be an “all-rounders” rather than brilliant in studies alone. The tag line — “Smart kids grow up on a daily diet of Parle-G” — worked for the brand. In this context, Parle-G acquired the image of an affordable and wholesome meal. Parle-G was positioned on a combination of energy and taste — as a food item that could be used as a “charger” when low on energy and a “tasty” accompaniment for a cup of tea or coffee. Although priced at the low end, the brand was straddling all SEC classifications. Parle-G was a leveler of social and economic strata in a vast country such as India. A single pack of Parle-G offered 450 calories, which was the value proposition Parle used effectively when promoting to the government, the benefits of using Parle-G as a meal substitute in primary schools. The federal government had mandated that every child attending school would receive a mid-day meal containing 300 calories and 8 to 12 g of protein per day for a minimum of 200 days a year. Parle-G had replaced cooked meals. It was positioned as “fortified nourishment” that nurtured an overall development of mind and body and enabled both mental and physical agility among children (see Exhibit 8). PACKAGING Small packages were the norm in India for attracting what was widely known as the bottom of pyramid (BOP) market. Several multinationals operating in India were customizing their unit packages to unlock local demand. Coca-Cola, for example, began selling 200-milliliter bottles of Coke in India in 2003. Also, 80 per cent of shampoo sales in India, from companies such as Hindustan Lever, derived from 8-ml and 16-ml sachets, costing INR0.50 and INR1.00 respectively. Small packages helped attract non-users, one-time users and new users. They were convenient and affordable for customers and translated into volumes for large companies. Single-serve packages were particularly useful in creating demand for low-penetration categories such as health food. The smallest SKU of Parle-G was a 16.5-g package containing four biscuits and priced at INR1 (US$0.023 cents). Small packages synergized with the Indian habit of top-up shopping, as opposed to the North American habit of buying large quantities in a single visit to the store.13 ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION Every year since 2004, Parle had spent between INR600 million and INR700 million on advertising and sales promotion. The ad spend was approximately two per cent of annual revenues. Of late, the company had begun to rely on celebrity endorsements, a promotions tactic popular with some of Parle-G’s competitors. Parle was airing commercials in which Aamir Khan, a popular Indian film actor, became entangled in humorous situations, which supported the tagline “G for genius.” 13 Atul Tandon, “Small Is Big”; available at 220.225.146.34/Open/MICA/Faculty/PAT/Small_Big/Small.ppt, accessed February 21, 2010.

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In its advertising, ITC Ltd. was using, among others, Sachin Tendulkar, an Indian cricketer, to endorse its Sunfeast Glucose brand. Focusing on the attributes of health and wellness, which were becoming popular among Indian consumers, ITC had launched a sub-brand it called Sunfeast Sachin’s FitKit in March 2007. Based on the cricketer’s own dietary regimen, FitKit came in two varieties — Sunfeast Sachin’s Vitamin & Protein Enriched (VPE) biscuits and Sunfeast Sachin’s Multigrain (MG) biscuits. BIL was targeting its Tiger brand of glucose biscuits almost exclusively at children. Focusing on the attributes of intelligence and physical fitness, which appealed to school-aged children, the advertisements also played on the brand name that symbolized strength. DISTRIBUTION India had 15 million retail outlets spread across the country. Parle-G was sold in 2.5 million outlets. It was available in every village with a population of 500 people, on a par with pre-paid mobile cards. The company had 8,000 wholesalers who had their own sales force. The company’s sales organization structure was based on geographies and included zonal sales managers, divisional sales managers, area managers, sales executives and sales officers. The logistics were handled by depots, which also served as clearing and forwarding agents. ISSUES IN DECEMBER 2009 Pricing was a larger issue that had spawned two other dilemmas for Kulkarnii. First, Parle-G had, no doubt, remained relevant and contemporary as a brand over the years. However, consumer perception was rooted so strongly in Parle-G’s low price that it was undermining other product attributes such as quality and taste. Said a marketing manager of a rival firm:

Companies build brand equity in order to deflect the focus of customers from price. Customers don’t mind paying a premium when a brand delivers value on a dimension as perceived by them. They also don’t mind loosening their wallets when prices are increased. They, in fact, expect periodic upward revisions. Parle-G has formidable equity in the Indian biscuits industry. But the paradox is that company cannot increase its price. The brand is caught in a warp of its own making. Its equity is built on VFM positioning. VFM is the only value dimension consumers seem to be plugged into with Parle-G. It is also the only value dimension they are plugged into with the glucose category which Parle-G leads. The situation is forcing peers, some with strong equity of their own, to hold the price line. It is compelling them to cope, like Parle- G, cope with lower margins.14

Parle needed a big idea to overcome the entrenched VFM perception, which could make a huge difference in Parle-G’s handling the current pricing dilemma. The right big idea could help customers loosen up and revive Parle-G’s marketing strategy. Kulkarnii wondered: “What would that big idea be?” 14 Based on a personal interview July 03, 2010.

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Second, the dependence on a single brand and a single SKU within it a brand seemed perilous. Parle-G was contributing 68 per cent of the company’s annual sales revenue, and the INR4.00 SKU was contributing to 50 per cent of Parle-G’s annual sales revenue. It was a vulnerable position. The company risked Parle-G being unseated from its leadership position by an upstart with deep pockets. The glucose category was already competitive and likely to become more competitive in future. Furthermore, customers were migrating to high-end biscuits belonging to the sweet, cream and milk categories. The migration was happening both in the biscuits industry and within Parle’s own portfolio. The contribution of Parle-G to the company’s sales revenue was expected to reduce to 62 per cent in 2010 and settle at approximately 50 per cent in a few years. Forecasts for 2010, streaming in from the field staff in a month, would likely point to an upward swing in the demand for brands other than Parle-G. Cannibalization of Parle-G seemed imminent without immediate action. A decline in the sales of Parle-G would invariably lead to a decline in market share. Said Kulkarnii:

A flagship brand should be generating a margin of 15 to 20 per cent of revenue. A margin of less than 10 per cent is unacceptable for Parle-G. I have to bite the bullet at some time on pricing. The concerns are several. Should I make tactical moves like launching new SKUs and new price points? Should I continue to tinker with the grammage? Is there a strategic move?15

15 Based on a personal interview July 04, 2010.

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Exhibit 1

PARLE-G –SKU HISTORY, 2006–2009

Maximum Retail Price

Stock Keeping Unit

(in grams)

Duration Maximum Retail Price

Stock Keeping Unit

(in grams)

Duration

INR1

19.0 Jan 08 – Jan 09 INR6 150.0 Jan 06 – Feb 07 16.0 Dec 05 – May 06

INR10

250.0 Jan 06 – Jan 07 17.5 Jun 07 – Dec 07 220.0 Jan 07 – Jan 09 16.5 Dec 08 – Dec 09 231.0 Sep 09 – Dec 09

INR2

50.0 Jun 06 – Dec 06 192.0 Jan 08 – Dec 08 44.0 Jan 07 –Dec 08 178.5 Dec 08 – Dec 09 38.5 Jan 09 – Dec 09 209.0 Dec 08 – Dec 09

INR3

75.0 Jan 06 – Jan 07 210.5 Nov 09 – Dec 09 66.0 Jan 07 – Dec 08 212.0 Aug 09 – Sep 09 77.0 Jan 07 – Jul 07 INR12 300.0 Jan 06 – Mar 07 79.2 Jul 07– Jan 09

INR15 330.0 Jan 07 – Jun 07

66.5 Dec 08 – Dec 09 313.0 May 07 – Jun 08 60.5 Dec 08 – Dec 09

INR20

500.0 Jan 06 – Feb 07 72.6 Dec 08 – Dec 09 440.0 Nov 07 – Jan 09

INR4

100.0 Jan 06 – Feb 07 462.0 May 07 – Apr 08 88.0 Jan 07 – Dec 08 418.0 Dec 08 – Dec 09 99.0 Jan 07 – May 07

INR25 550.0 Apr 08 – Nov 08

93.5 May 07– Apr 08 577.5 Jun 07 – Apr 08 82.5 Dec 08- Dec 09

INR40 1,000.0 Jan 06 – Jan 07

INR5

110.0 Jan 08 – Feb 08 880.0 Jan 08 – Jan 09 99.0 Dec 08 – Dec 09 935.0 May 07 – Jan 08 88.0 Dec 08 – Dec 09 825.0 Dec 08 – Dec 09

Source: Company files.

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Exhibit 2

INDIAN CONSUMERS – CHANGING PROFILE

Consumer Category

Annual Income Range at the

Individual Level

Number of Households at the

National Level

Aggregate Income at the National

Level

Aggregate Consumption at

the National Level (in thousands of

INR) (in millions) (in trillions of

INR) (in trillions of

INR) 2005 Globals Strivers Seekers Aspirers Deprived Total

(1,001 – plus) 501–1,000 201–500 91–200

<90 –

1.2 2.4 10.9 91.3 101.3 207.1

2.0 1.6 3.1 11.4 5.4 23.5

1.2 1.0 2.0 8.5 4.1 16.8

2015 Globals Strivers Seekers Aspirers Deprived Total

(1,001 – plus) 501–1,000 201–500 91–200

<90 –

3.3 5.5 55.1 106.1 74.0 244.0

6.3 3.8 15.2 14.6 3.8 43.7

4.1 2.7 11.8 12.2 3.3 34.1

2025 Globals Strivers Seekers Aspirers Deprived Total

(1,001 – plus) 501–1,000 201–500 91–200

<90 –

9.5 33.1 94.9 93.1 49.9 280.5

21.7 20.9 30.6 13.7 2.6 89.5

14.1 16.5 24.6 11.9 2.4 69.5

Source: www.mckinsey.com/McKinsey_Global_Institute/research_topics/Consumer_Demand_and_Demographics. Adapted from exhibit 3 on page 13 of McKinsey and Company, “The Bird of Gold: The Rise of India’s Consumer market,” McKinsey Global Institute, May 2007.

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Exhibit 3

INDIA’S SOCIO ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATIONS AND NUMBERS OF HOUSEHOLDS, 2005

SEC Class

Estimated Number of Households (in millions)

A1 A2 B1 B2 C D E1 E2 R1 R2 R3 R4

2.2 4.1 5.3 5.3 12.8 14.2 6.7 10.8 5.8 15.9 56.7 67.3

Total 207.1 Notes: SEC = socio economic classification. SEC indicates the affluence level of a household to which an individual belongs. SEC of an urban household is defined by the education and occupation of the chief wage earner of a household. It has 8 categories, A1, A2, B1, B2, C, D, E1 and E2, which are rated in descending order of affluence. SEC of a rural household is defined by the education and occupation of the chief wage earner of a household. It has four categories, R1, R2, R3 and R4, rated in descending order of affluence. The top band of purchasing power in India, Urban A1A2, comprised a little more than 6 million households. The next band, which would qualify for the “middle-class India” label, comprising B1R1B2C, harbored approximately 30 million households. The ABCR1 target group, which would form the broadest possible target group for most consumer goods, comprised approximately 36 million households. The lower middle-class comprised DE1R2 at approximately 37 million households. Source: Market Research Society of India.

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Exhibit 4

INDIAN BISCUIT CATEGORY AND BRAND PENETRATION

Number of Indian Households That Purchased Biscuits, October 2008 to December 2009 (in millions)

SEC Class

Biscuits (all categories) Glucose Category Parle-G Brand 178.8 % 114.9 % 96.8 %

A1 and A2 B1 and B2 C D E1 and E2 R1 R2 R3 R4

7.0 10.7 12.4 13.2 14.7 6.0 17.2 50.0 47.6

3.9 6.0 6.9 7.4 8.2 3.3 9.6 28.0 26.6

3.2 5.6 7.3 8.4 9.9 3.6 11.4 32.7 32.8

2.8 4.9 6.3 7.3 8.6 3.1 9.9 28.4 28.5

2.4 4.6 6.0 7.0 8.5 3.0 9.3 27.7 28.3

2.4 4.7 6.2 7.2 8.7 3.1 9.6 28.6 29.2

Source: Company files.

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Exhibit 5

INDIAN DEMOGRAPHY

(Population in millions) Age group in years 2001 2011* 2021*

0–4 5–9 10–14

110.45 128.31 124.85

115.58 115.43 120.43

110.96 112.69 113.07

15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34

100.21 89.76 83.44 74.27

119.99 116.21 103.84

92.33

114.31 119.10 118.23 114.23

YOUNG POPULATION (15–34) 347.68 432.38 465.88 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64

70.57 55.74 47.40 36.58 27.67 27.52

83.62 74.09 63.51 52.43 41.82 32.58

101.85 90.19 80.96 70.58 59.03 47.02

WORKING POPULATION (15–64) 613.16 780.43 915.51 65–69 70–74 75–79 80 plus Age not stated

19.81 14.71 6.55 8.03 2.74

24.92 18.74 12.55 8.46

–

35.56 25.71 17.53 15.99

– TOTAL POPULATION 1,028.61 1,196.55 1,347.02

* Projected population Note: The government of India conducted the official census once each decade. The most recent census was held in 2001. Source: http://mospi.nic.in/Adapted from Youth in India – Profiles and Programmes, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation of the Government of India, October 2006, Table 2(a) “Distribution of population by age and sex, 2001- 2021,” p. 37; available at htpp://www.mospi.gov.in, accessed July 14, 2010.

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Exhibit 6

MARKET SHARES OF THE INDIAN GLUCOSE BISCUIT CATEGORY

Brand 2007 2008 2009 Parle-G 67 69 74 Tiger Glucose 18 16 13 Sunfeast Glucose 10 10 9 Others 5 5 4

Source: Company files.

Exhibit 7

PARLE’S COMPETITORS IN THE BISCUIT CATEGORY

Existing Company Biscuit Category Future Plans Year of

Entry Brands

Britannia Industries Ltd.

1999 Glucose category: Tiger Tea time category: Marie Gold Premium categories: Good Day, Bourbon, 50-50, Treat, Milk Bikis, Timepass, NutriChoice, Little Hearts

• Outsource production • Invest INR400 million in the biscuit segment. • Launch a variety of products around the Tiger brand

Hindustan Unilever Ltd.

2003 Glucose category: Modern Withdrawn

ITC Ltd. 2002 Glucose category: Sunfeast Tea time category: Marie Light Other categories: Milky Magic, Golden Bakery, Dark Fantasy, Dream Cream, Snacky, Sweet n Salt, Nice, Benne, Vita Flaxseed, Sunfeast Special

–

Surya Food & Agro Ltd.

1992 Glucose category: Priya Gold Tea time category: Marie Lite Premium categories: Big Boss Milk Classic, Bourbon, Magic Gold, Coconut Crunch

Moving beyond the institutional markets

Anmol Biscuits Ltd.

– Glucose category: Anmol Premium categories: Yummy, Lemon Mazaa, Coconutty, Funfill

Going beyond eastern and northern Indian markets

Imminent GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare: Junior Horlicks Biscuits PepsiCo India: Aliva to be produced by foods division Frito Lay India United Biscuits (UK) Kellogg India Nestle India Nabisco Foods Campbell Arnott’s Source: Company files.

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Exhibit 8

PARLE-G – POSITIONING HIGHLIGHTS

Year Goal Target Audience Core Messaging 1982 To seek differentiation through a

name change from Parle-Glucose to Parle-G

Mass market Parle-G is healthy.

1990 To reinforce health benefits Mothers and children Parle-G brings out the essential goodness.

1996 To seize a market opportunity by targeting consumers in South and East India who were short on milk intake

Mothers and children Parle-G makes up for lack of milk.

1998 To communicate a new attribute Mothers and children Parle-G provides energy and personal power.

2003 To communicate a new attribute Mothers and children Parle-G is more than a biscuit, it is fortified nourishment.

2004 To enhance communications with celebrity endorsements and new messaging

Mothers and children Parle-G makes kids smart, turns them into geniuses.

Source: Company files.

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